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Article

POINT
counterPOINT
The Miranda Decision is Showing
Its Age and Should Be Replaced
And Prosecutors Now Have an Argument They Can Make to that Effect
by Paul Cassell

A little over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court handed down

what may be its most controversial criminal law decision ever
– Miranda v. Arizona. The decades since then have revealed
Miranda to be not only bad constitutional law but also bad
public policy. With the benefit of recent experience and modern
technology, it is possible to design rules that not only more
effectively protect legitimate interests of suspects but also insure
that police are not unduly handcuffed as they investigate crimes.
Contrary to the prevailing myth that is often peddled, Miranda’s
rules have significantly impeded law enforcement’s ability to
prosecute dangerous criminals. University of Utah Economics
Professor Richard Fowles and I have recently assembled all the
relevant data on the subject. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of
Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law
Enforcement, 97 Bost. U.L. Rev. 685 (2017). One source of
information comes from the “before-and-after” studies of
confession rates in the year or two after the decision. For example,
a study in Pittsburgh revealed that confession rates fell from 48%
before the decision to 29% after. Similar results were reported
in Manhattan, Philadelphia, Kansas City, Brooklyn, New Orleans,
and Chicago. The few studies to the contrary were done almost
immediately after Miranda in jurisdictions where police did not
in fact follow all of the decision’s procedural rules.
It might be argued that this data about Miranda’s harmful
effects comes in the immediate wake of the decision and that,
since then, police have learned to “live with” Miranda. But
surprisingly little hard data has been collected on Miranda’s
effects. One of the rare exceptions is a study that Bret Hayman
and I conducted in the mid-1990s of confession rates in Salt
Lake County. Relying on data collected at the Salt Lake District
Attorney’s Office, we concluded that police collected incriminating
statements from suspects in only about 33.3% of criminal cases
in Salt Lake County – a rate well below confession rates generally
reported in the country before Miranda. Paul G. Cassell & Bret
S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
18

Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 839, 871 (1996).
Some have argued that this individual study might be an outlier
because it would be impossible to say whether Salt Lake County’s
experience was typical of the nation’s. Unfortunately, data on
confession rates is not routinely collected in this country to
confirm or dispel this argument. But a surrogate measure for
confession rates can be found in clearance rates – the rate at
which police officers solve or “clear” crimes. The FBI collects
clearance rate data from around the country. And defenders of
Miranda have argued that clearance rate data shows that police
were quickly able to develop new techniques that allowed them
to investigate crimes as successfully after the decision as before.
Unfortunately, the FBI’s clearance rate data depict a different
pattern. As shown in the accompanying graph, crime clearance
rates fell immediately after Miranda and have remained
substantially below pre-Miranda levels ever since.
Professor Fowles and I have extensively analyzed what factors might
have been responsible for this decline in clearance rates. In our
article, we report the results of multiple regression equations on
crime clearance rates from 1950 to 2012, controlling for factors
apart from Miranda that might be responsible for changes in
clearance rates. Even controlling for potentially competing factors,
we find statistically significant reductions in crime clearance
rates after Miranda for violent and property crimes, as well as
for robbery, larceny, and vehicle theft – crimes that most likely
involved “professional” criminals who were most likely to have
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learned how to take advantage of the Miranda rules. We also
quantify the number of lost clearances that appear to be due to
Miranda, concluding that about 200,000 violent crimes and about
900,000 property crimes might be cleared each year without
the Miranda requirements. Cassell & Fowles, supra, at 732.

concluding that “[e]vidence is hard to come by but what
evidence there is suggests that any reductions that have been
achieved in police brutality are independent of the Court and
started before Miranda.” Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow
Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 326 (1991).

My friend and colleague at the S.J. Quinney College of Law, Professor
Amos N. Guiora, has recently written a very interesting book discussing
the legacy of the Miranda decision. In Earl Warren, Ernesto Miranda,
and Terrorism (Twelve Tables Press 2018), Guiora argues that Chief
Justice Warren would pay scant attention to such empirical evidence
of the calamitous effects that his narrowly divided (5–4) decision
had on the nation. In this historical assessment, Guiora is likely
correct. When he authored the decision, Chief Justice Warren
blithely minimized the warnings of his dissenting colleagues.
For example, Justice Harlan warned, “I believe the decision of
the Court…entails harmful consequences for the country at
large. How serious these consequences may prove to be only
time can tell.…The social costs of crime are too great to call
the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Professor Guiora also refers to Miranda as a “necessary evil.”
But the Miranda rules are not the only way to approach issues
concerning police questioning. Indeed, in the Miranda opinion
itself, Chief Justice Warren (at the suggestion of Justice Brennan)
stated that the decision “in no way creates a constitutional
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform” and that
the Court “encourage[d] Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of
our criminal laws.” Id. at 467. Just as in other endeavors of
modern life, we have learned a great deal over the last fifty years
that could be used to effectively reform the Miranda rules.

In reviewing Miranda’s legacy, Professor Guiora gamely attempts to
credit Miranda with reducing police brutality. But the available
data do not support any such linkage. For example, Professor
Gerald Rosenberg has comprehensively reviewed the issue,
19
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One thing that we have learned is that Miranda, if anything,
exacerbates the problem of false confessions. Miranda offers
essentially no protection to vulnerable innocent persons who
erroneously fall under police suspicion, such as intellectually
disabled suspects. Such persons typically eagerly waive their
Miranda rights and may ultimately, in some rare cases, be
induced to offer false confessions. On the other hand, as the

Volume 31 No. 5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251110

Articles The Miranda Decision is Showing Its Age

Figure 1 – National Violent Crime Clearance Rate, 1950–2012
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clearance rate data above suggest, professional criminals are the
most likely to invoke Miranda questioning cut-off rules, blocking
any questioning whatsoever. As many academics who have closely
studied Miranda have concluded, the upshot is that Miranda’s
rules “shielded some savvy, guilty recidivists while doing little to
protect the [intellectually disabled], juveniles, and other innocent
defendants most likely to confess.” Stephanos Bibas, The Right
to Remain Silent, 158 U. PA. L. Rev. Penumbra 69, 77 (2010).
Indeed, it seems likely that by diverting judicial attention towards
procedural issues of Miranda compliance and away from
underlying “voluntariness” questions, Miranda has affirmatively
harmed vulnerable persons who have given false confessions.
One solution to such problems is to videotape police interrogations,
as many commentators have recognized. Electronic recording of
interrogations allows later judicial review to more powerfully detect
false confessions and inappropriate police techniques that are
sometimes hard to review without an objective record. Interestingly,
many police agencies (including Utah agencies) currently electronically
record interrogations, subject to certain limited exceptions.
Videorecording provides far more protection against coercive
tactics and “false” confessions than the Miranda rules ever did.
In a case where police interrogation has been recorded, prosecutors
in Utah and elsewhere should consider advancing parallel arguments
to trial courts. In addition to the standard arguments about Miranda
compliance or inapplicability, prosecutors should also argue
that the Miranda regime is no longer necessary to satisfy the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment. As noted above, Miranda
itself encouraged the states to explore other ways to protect
suspects’ rights. Electronic recording is such a means. And, since
1966, a whole host of changes have occurred in American policing,
such as greater training and professionalization, that means that
any arguable need for such rules is much weaker today.
Excluding reliable evidence should always be a last resort. As Justice
Lee recently explained in connection with the search and seizure
exclusionary rule, “[I]ts bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to
suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community
without punishment.” State v. Rowan, 2017 UT 88, ¶ 52, 416 P.3d
566 (Lee, J., concurring). Where a defendant seeks to exclude his or
her voluntary confession under Miranda, suppressing the confession
can similarly lead to a miscarriage of justice. Contrary to Professor
Guiora’s suggestion, a court rule like Miranda that automatically and
often arbitrarily excludes a confession, without regard to its reliability
or voluntariness, by definition favors criminals over victims.
With its historical focus, Professor Guiora’s article harkens back
to the turmoil of the 1960s, when Chief Justice Warren engaged
in what has to be regarded as the paradigm example of judicial
legislation. But in the decades since Warren penned Miranda,
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the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Miranda rules are
not themselves constitutional rights but are mere “prophylactic
safeguards” – presumably subject to appropriate modification by
Congress or the states. To be sure, in one post-Miranda case, the
Supreme Court rejected an argument that a sufficient alternative
had been put in place of the Miranda rules. That was Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), a case I argued to the Supreme
Court. But in that case, the alternative to Miranda was, according
to the Dickerson majority, nothing other than a federal statute
authorizing a return to the pre-Miranda voluntariness rules.
Videotaping, of course, is not something that was mandated (or
even readily available) before Miranda. Thus, a prosecutor could
make a very strong alternative argument that videotaping (along
with other safeguards) serves as a legitimate substitute for the
prophylactic Miranda requirements under the U.S. Constitution.
And in Utah (as in many other states), the state constitution has never
been interpreted as imposing the novel Miranda requirements as a
matter of state constitutional law. See State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738,
743 (Utah 1997) (“‘[T]his Court has never specifically held that
Miranda-type warnings are required under the Utah Constitution’”.)
(citation omitted).
Videotaping deters genuine police misconduct more effectively than
Miranda by creating a clear record of police and suspect demeanor
during questioning. To be sure, police can turn off videocameras or
deploy force off-camera. But if you were facing a police officer with
a rubber hose, would you prefer a world in which he was required
to mumble the Miranda warnings and have you give some form of
waiver of rights (all proven by his later testimony)? Or a world in
which the interrogation is videorecorded, where your physical
appearance and demeanor during any “confession” are permanently
recorded, where date and time are electronically stamped on
the tape? Videotaping is the clear winner.
In closing, I agree with Professor Guiora that protecting constitutional
rights is as important in 2018 as it was in 1966. But it is folly to
think that the unprecedented rules Chief Justice Warren thought
would best serve the country at the time should remain frozen in
time as the only way to address constitutional issues involved in police
questioning. More than fifty years later, prosecutors in Utah and
elsewhere can now argue that, with more modern tools like
videotaping often available and more professional police training
for law enforcement officers, a different world exists. This legal
regime still requires that police refrain from coercive tactics that
obtain involuntary statements. But when police have obtained a
clearly voluntary statement from a suspect as documented by
videorecorded evidence, the technical Miranda rules should be
regarded as superseded relics of an outmoded and harmful
prophylactic regime.
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POINT
counterPOINT
Miranda v. Arizona:
Pain Management: Protecting the Vulnerable
by Amos N. Guiora
Interrogations reflect an imbalance between the interrogator
and suspect, a nitty-gritty confluence of fear, anxiety, and control.

My “counter-point” to Professor Cassell’s thoughtful and well

argued “point” reflecting path-breaking empirical research that has
drawn, justifiably, wide commentary, focuses on interrogations
from the suspect’s perspective. That is in accordance with the
essence of the holding in Miranda v. Arizona.
Chief Justice Earl Warren emphasized the vulnerability of the individual
in the inherently coercive environment of an interrogation. For Warren,
as for me, the power, importance, and centrality of Miranda is the
focus on protecting the constitutional rights of the vulnerable
individual. That is the theme of this counterpoint; I believe this approach
most accurately represents what J Warren believed and wrote in
as clear a language as possible. Warren’s holding guaranteed the
protection of a right guaranteed in the Constitution to an individual.
Any proposed weakening of Miranda, beyond the Quarles
exception, would represent unwarranted evisceration; while
body cams or any other technological tools are doubtlessly
valuable, they must not come in the place of the interrogator’s
clear articulation to the suspect of his/her Miranda rights.
I am of the opinion that these words are amongst the most
important ever penned in a Supreme Court decision. As simple
as they are, they are majestic.
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say
can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford
an attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you
understand the rights I have just read to you? With
these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?
Introduction:
To solve a crime, the interrogator needs information. The
essence of police work is gathering information, collecting
evidence, connecting various dots, and then determining who is
21

responsible for violating the law. There is nothing magical about
this. While contemporary methods are more sophisticated,
more scientifically based and, hopefully, more objective than in
years past, the critical interaction is between the two individuals.
As Earl Warren fully understood, that relationship is at the epicenter
of criminal law and procedure. The interrogator wants the truth.
That is the purest form of law enforcement in the ideal. What
Warren feared was an interrogator who wants a confession and
for the suspect to incriminate himself or herself and say, “I did
it” regardless of the truth. That is an interrogator who coerces a
confession from the suspect.
If there is one word that captures the interrogation paradigm it is
“coercive.” While the environment is not intended to resemble
comfort and leisure, the question is to what degree does the
suspect have to be coerced before confessing. The environment
– in its totality – is coercive. Coercion is inherent to interrogation.
The physicality is obvious and telling. The suspect is handcuffed.
The suspect is accused of having committed a crime.
Miranda v. Arizona
Chief Justice Earl Warren sought to protect the vulnerable; he
clearly understood the realities of the interrogation paradigm.
Warren, based on his experiences as a District Attorney, was
fully cognizant of the inherent imbalance between the interrogator
and the suspect. As the opinion made clear, Warren recognized
interrogations are inherently coercive.
His motivations were simultaneously simple and profound; simple
in that he wanted to protect suspects, profound in that he imposed
AMOS GUIROA is a Professor of Law at
the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the
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The Crime of Complicity: The Bystander in
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While law enforcement loudly complained that the decision
“handcuffed” police officers, Earl Warren believed protecting
the individual was paramount. The tension between these two
perspectives must be acknowledged. It would not be an
exaggeration to use the phrase “necessary evil” in describing
how Miranda is perceived in certain quarters.
There is no indication Detective Carroll Cooley pressured or coerced
Ernesto Miranda during the course of the interrogation. Arguably,
that was a strategic decision by Warren: there was nothing unusual or
extraordinary in how Miranda was interrogated; it was a run-of-the-mill
interrogation conducted in the aftermath of a crime with nothing
to indicate its uniqueness. Miranda was not subject to a violent,
physical interrogation conjured up in images of sheriff deputies
beating African-American suspects in the back seat.
Viewing the case in that context increases the power of the
holding; were Miranda the victim of a back-seat beating then it
would be possible to dismiss the opinion suggesting, “of course
the suspect has to be protected; otherwise, he’ll come within a
whisker of a brutal death.” That dismissiveness cannot be
applied given how Cooley interrogated Miranda. The facts of
Miranda’s interrogation lent themselves to Warren’s decision to
“use” Miranda as the platform to extend Escobedo.
It is not by chance that Warren penned the opinion himself.
Unlike his fellow justices, Warren had been elected to serve as
district attorney and had intimate knowledge of the interrogation
paradigm.1 The opinion is neither complex nor sophisticated; it
is written in a manner that any member of the public and law
enforcement can easily understand. There is no hidden ball and
no “between the lines” analysis required to comprehend its full
import. This was a clear directive; this was not the time or place
for nuance. The message was unequivocal.
For Warren, the most effective way to protect the suspect was to
22

The decision represents recognition of the mistreatment of
suspects throughout history. That is an extraordinarily
important acknowledgment both for the specific suspect and for
the relationship between the state and the individual. The
decision is powerful on a micro and macro scale alike.
Protecting the suspect was essential.
There is no doubt Warren was fully aware of the injustices that had
been visited upon suspects over the years. In establishing a rights-based
interrogation regime, Warren was also protecting larger society
from the consequences of confessions elicited from mistreated
suspects. Warren was concerned about the lack of professionalism
amongst police departments; he believed coerced confessions
reflected laziness amongst police officers. In addition, coerced
confessions resulted in wrongful convictions. The consequences
from all perspectives were, for Warren, deeply troubling.
In establishing the Miranda warnings, Warren and the four
justices who joined him took a clear and bold stand regarding
interrogations. Admittedly long, the opinion explains the core issue
in a manner that left no doubt as to the writer’s intention. The
language is neither soaring nor particularly elegant. The prose
is not of a poet; Warren was neither bard nor man of letters. The
directness conveys a powerful message to interrogators: ENOUGH.
Emphasizing the suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was the cornerstone of the decision; the
“right to remain silent” is the practical, jurisprudential, and
existential core of the opinion. For Warren, protecting that
constitutionally guaranteed privilege was of the essence. It is not
an exaggeration to suggest that, for Warren, it was sacrosanct.
The opinion must be read accordingly.
The centerpiece of the decision was ensuring the suspect be
protected from state agents.
That does not mean, as some have suggested, that Warren
minimized harm caused to the victim of a crime. I believe that
to be a spurious charge. One must not forget that Warren well
understood victims’ pain; his own father had been murdered.
Warren was sympathetic to the victim; however, he differentiated
between the victim’s unquestioned harm and suffering and the
individual suspected of having committed the crime in question.
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The opinion was not written in a vacuum; America in 1966 was in
turmoil. The Harlem and Watts riots of 1964 and 1965 dramatically
and violently highlighted profound anger, resentment, and social
injustice. The Detroit and Newark riots in 1967 and the riots that
followed the assassination of Dr. King in 1968 were extremely
violent, resulting in significant loss of life, requiring intervention
by the U.S. military. In between those two “book-ends,” Earl
Warren’s Supreme Court imposed limits on law enforcement.

inform the suspects that they had the right to remain silent and
that, if need be, an attorney would be provided. The obligation
imposed on the interrogator was two-fold: to read the suspect
the warning and to ensure that the suspect understood the rights
granted. Whether the suspect chose to exercise the right or to
“waive” was a personal decision. To be made by the suspect.

Articles

limits on how the nation state interacted with vulnerable
individuals. That is, in protecting those suspected of criminal
activity, Warren sent a clear message to law enforcement and
society. That message, while focusing on the specific individual, also
had powerful consequences regarding the larger society.
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The difference is significant: the victim was clearly identified, the
suspect but a suspect. Protecting the rights of the latter does not,
in any way, trivialize or disrespect the suffering of the former. To
suggest that Warren preferred one over the other or was more
sympathetic to suspects than to victims is erroneous. It also
significantly misses the point of the opinion and what was of
grave concern to the majority. The opinion was neither victim
“unfriendly” nor suspect “friendly.” That is to miss the point.
Rather, Earl Warren, as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,
sought to ensure that basic constitutional rights were protected
in the interrogation setting and that law enforcement respected
the rights of the suspect.
Below are excerpts from the opinion which Warren read in its
entirety on June 13, 1966.
The cases before us raise questions which go to the
roots of our concepts of American criminal
jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe
consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting
individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with
the admissibility of statements obtained from an
individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation and the necessity for procedures
which assure that the individual is accorded his
privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney before speaking, there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The
mere fact that he may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering
any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
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The constitutional issue we decide in each of these
cases is the admissibility of statements obtained
from a defendant questioned while in custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
Who is in Control: What Needs Protection?
Control is critical to understanding interrogation. Who controls,
who is controlled. The struggle is intense, intensive, high-stakes,
and constant. That is fair enough and not surprising. The
question is whether the “game” is played within acceptable
rules and boundaries.
As Warren wrote, interrogations were inherently coercive, and
suspects had to be protected. Warren did not say “all” detectives
violated suspect rights for that would be an unjustified exaggeration,
casting unwarranted aspersions on the law enforcement
community; he did, however, make it crystal clear that how
interrogations were conducted had to change. And the change
that was required had one intention: to protect the suspect
whose rights, according to Warren, must be protected.
Did Warren anger detectives? Safe to assume. Were “clean”
detectives made to feel “guilty”? Probably. Was the public angry?
Certainly, a segment. No doubt about that.
In describing interrogations as coercive, Warren threw the
gauntlet down.
For all the seeming fairness, protection, and process that
appear to be in place, the reality is the following: The suspect
exercises little, if any control, in the interrogation setting. That’s
just the way it is.2
That lack of control, the dependence on the interrogator, the
inability to withstand pressure – whether real or imagined – is
what defines the interrogation setting.
Protecting constitutional rights is as important in 2018 as in 1966.
Protecting a suspect’s rights is as important in 2018 as it was
in 1966.
Based on my research, I am convinced CJ Warren would
wholeheartedly concur with both conclusions.
1. Justice Tom Clark served as an assistant district attorney, https://www.oyez.org/
justices/tom_c_clark.
2. For more on interrogations, see: Wrongful Convictions, Rights Violated During
Police Interrogation, YouTube (Nov. 16, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rM1bVvPTL6g; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-VW8Ldw6YI.
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